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Abstract: Ecological compensation involves measures to create positive conservation outcomes intended to 
offset the residual impacts of development (e.g. restoration planting, pest control). Rarely, however, have the 
exchanges arranged been subject to objective assessment. Here we assess 110 cases of ecological compensation 
involving diverse New Zealand ecosystems on the basis of how they addressed the six key implementation 
issues identified by McKenney and Kiesecker (2010: Environmental Management 45: 165–176): equivalence, 
location (i.e. spatial proximity), additionality, timing, duration and compliance, and currencies. Our research 
showed that habitat enhancement and protection is the most common form of ecological compensation, and 
that 72 of 110 case studies undertook compensation on the same site or immediately adjacent. The great 
majority (94.5%) of compensation was required by condition of resource consent to be demonstrated after the 
development had proceeded, with an average of 11.3 years of continuing management or monitoring required. 
The most common form of security other than a consent condition was a covenant (29 of 110 cases) followed 
by a resource management bond (25). We also found that in 97 cases there was no objective quantification of 
the compensation needed to make up for impact losses, with the requirements being devised by negotiation 
between parties with the assistance of expert input. We recognise the potential of ecological compensation 
as a policy tool, but recommend that significant improvements are made to its implementation to enhance 
ecological outcomes.
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Introduction
The need to extract resources, alter land use and dispose of 
waste results in continuing adverse effects on biodiversity 
and ecosystems. Ecological compensation, although widely 
criticised for failures of implementation (Hornyak & Halvorsen 
2003; Gibbons & Lindenmayer 2007; Burgin 2008; Walker 
et al. 2009), is promoted as a potentially important mechanism 
to alleviate the pressures of ongoing development and to 
contribute to achieving wider conservation goals (BBOP 
2009; Quertier & Lavorel 2011; Gillespie 2012). Ecological 
compensation is typically an agreed positive conservation 
action intended to compensate for losses of habitat and 
ecosystem function caused by development and resource use. 
It is a commonly used mechanism that brings together the 
often conflicting priorities of environmental protection and 
economic development, in a system of trade-offs. These trade-
offs are inherent in environmental management and occur at 
all stages of the development process (Murray & Swaffield 
1994; Morrison-Saunders & Pope 2013).
At present, ecological compensation in New Zealand is 
implemented under both the Resource Management Act 1991 
(hereafter RMA) and the Conservation Act 1987, typically as a 
condition of approval for development to occur. New Zealand 
does not have an explicit policy framework for ecological 
compensation. While ecological science contributes to the 
determination of appropriate compensation, such agreements 
are typically the product of negotiation between parties 
(Galatowitsch 2012). There is no national-level policy on the 
matter and very few regional and local planning instruments 
make specific reference to ecological compensation. Most 
resource consents do not include outcome-oriented conditions, 
as demonstrated in our related study of regulatory compliance 
with ecological compensation, where just 10 conditions of 245 
specifically articulated a restoration-related outcome (Brown 
et al. 2013). In the general absence of goals that specifically 
relate to the implementation goals of ecological compensation, 
we draw upon an existing framework to facilitate assessment 
and evaluation of the New Zealand example. We examine the 
ecological compensation requirements in 110 case studies 
of resource consents issued under the RMA, against the 
six key implementation issues identified by McKenney and 
Kiesecker (2010): equivalence, location (i.e. spatial proximity), 
additionality, timing, duration and compliance, and the use of 
currencies and ratios in determining appropriate compensation. 
McKenney and Kiesecker discussed the overall approach to 
applying the concept, the presence or absence of the goal of no 
net loss of biodiversity, and the use of the mitigation hierarchy. 
We also consider these elements in the New Zealand context.
In New Zealand, ecological compensation is referred to 
mainly as mitigation, compensation or biodiversity-offsetting, 
with varying and evolving opinions on the distinctions between 
each of those terms that is not always consistent with use of 
that same term in other jurisdictions (Christensen 2008; Norton 
2008). It is, however, likely that implementation issues across 
all types of ecological compensation are broadly the same, and 
are articulated in planning permissions (‘resource consents’ 
under the RMA) in a similar manner. In this research therefore, 
‘ecological compensation’ is an umbrella term defined as:
Positive conservation actions required by resource consent, 
and intended to compensate for residual adverse effects 
of development and resource use (Brown et al. 2013)
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Ecological compensation under the RMA
The RMA, New Zealand’s principal environmental legislation, 
does not specifically mention ecological compensation, nor is 
there a national-level policy to guide decision-making. Regional 
councils and city or district councils issue planning permission 
(in the form of resource consents) to allow activities to be 
undertaken that have adverse effects and sometimes require 
ecological compensation. A proposal to mitigate, compensate 
or offset ecological harm is one of the wide range of factors 
that a consent authority can take into account under section 
104 of the Act (which outlines matters the decision-maker must 
have regard to in determining whether to grant the consent 
and under what conditions).
Internationally, policies that address ecological 
compensation typically emphasise the mitigation hierarchy 
(i.e. avoid ecological effects, minimise impacts, and finally 
mitigate or offset the residual effects; McKenney & Kiesecker 
2010; Gardner & von Hase 2012). While New Zealand law does 
not explicitly require adherence to the mitigation hierarchy, 
in a recent Board of Inquiry decision on a plan change and 
accompanying resource consent related to a major roading 
project (Transmission Gully), it was noted that a mitigation 
hierarchy was supported by ecological evidence and was 
broadly consistent with the RMA (Environmental Protection 
Authority 2011; Christensen 2012).
No net loss
Ecological compensation, and biodiversity offsets in particular, 
are often highlighted as a mechanism to achieve ‘no net loss 
or preferably net gain’ of biodiversity (ten Kate et al. 2004). 
This generally requires that what is lost in development 
is counterbalanced by conservation gains that are at least 
equivalent and preferably greater in value, although the 
definition of this goal and measurement of success or failure 
varies across stakeholders and jurisdictions (Bull et al. 2013). 
It is articulated in the first of the 10 principles on biodiversity 
offsets developed by the Business and Biodiversity Offsets 
Programme (BBOP 2009). The goal itself is criticised as being 
symbolic and rarely achieved (Burgin 2010), with Walker 
et al. (2009) referring to it as ‘administratively improbable 
and technically unrealistic’. Further, as the Transmission 
Gully Board of Inquiry noted, applicants can choose to state 
‘no net loss’ as a goal, but they are not legislatively bound 
to demonstrate that it has been achieved (Environmental 
Protection Authority 2011).
Key implementation issues
There have been several comprehensive reviews worldwide of 
ecological compensation schemes and most reveal significant 




Equivalence Equivalence and similarity of compensatory action with the impact being addressed (i.e. in-kind or   
 out-of-kind)
Spatial proximity Location of compensation in relation to the site of impact, with an assumption that closer is better
Additionality The compensation action must be a new contribution to conservation that would not have otherwise   
 occurred
Timing Timing of demonstrating the compensation, relative to the timing of the impact
Duration & compliance The required longevity of the compensation action and security of delivery
Currency & ratios Metrics used to determine exchanges including mitigation replacement ratios
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
problems with implementation and follow-up (Hornyak & 
Halvorsen 2003; Gibbons & Lindenmayer 2007; Burgin 
2010; Walker 2010; Quertier & Lavorel 2011). Here we use 
the framework proposed by McKenney and Kiesecker (2010) 
(summarised in Table 1) to examine compensation in the 
New Zealand context, and generate recommendations aimed 
at improving implementation. We chose to use this framework 
because of its broad applicability and clear articulation of key 
matters that facilitate a consistency with transferable learning 
outcomes.
Ecological equivalence is a goal of compensatory 
mechanisms and can be determined at a range of scales. At 
the broadest scale, exchanges are grouped into in-kind or 
out-of-kind relating to the similarity of elements to be traded 
(McKenney & Kiesecker 2010). In-kind refers to protection or 
enhancement of a similar value while out-of-kind compensation 
involves different values of greater conservation significance 
(also referred to as a ‘trade-up’).
Compensatory works should occur near the site of impact 
(McKenney & Kiesecker 2010) to avoid negative ecological and 
social outcomes of compensation at a distance. In practice the 
investment of mitigation money leveraged from impacts on one 
habitat type is often used to ameliorate broader impacts affecting 
areas of higher strategic conservation importance (Blundell 
& Burkey 2007; McKenney & Kiesecker 2010). Aggregating 
efforts into large areas of habitat instead of many smaller and 
fragmented compensation projects located haphazardly around 
the landscape has been shown to perform better ecologically 
(Breaux et al. 2005; McKenney & Kiesecker 2010).
Additionality demands that compensatory actions are new 
and would not have occurred under the status quo (McKenney & 
Kiesecker 2010). Assessment of additionality requires that the 
future level of management under the status quo must be reliably 
forecasted, which is difficult. Common approaches include 
set-asides, habitat improvements or financial contributions. 
The level of additionality is dependent upon the current level 
of protection and management of the habitat (at a range of 
scales), as well as the inherent vulnerability of that habitat type. 
If the habitat set-aside is adequately represented elsewhere, 
already protected or not otherwise vulnerable, then it is not 
likely a new gain and therefore not additional (Gibbons & 
Lindenmayer 2007).
The timing of compensatory benefits should be similar 
to the loss so that temporal equivalence is achieved, and lags 
between impact and compensation are minimised. Planting 
to offset the loss of existing older habitat may take decades 
or centuries to be of similar value to an extant habitat, with 
the time lag potentially risking threatened species’ population 
viability and leading to extinction (Gibbons & Lindenmayer 
2007; Maron et al. 2010). Securing compensation gains in 
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advance is the most efficient and reliable means of orchestrating 
robust exchanges because it limits uncertainty (Bekessy et al. 
2010; Gardner & von Hase 2012). Advance mitigation enables 
applicants to plan for and reliably demonstrate gains in advance, 
which may be important to securing access to diminishing 
resources such as minerals (Kuiper 1997; Greer & Som 2010).
Failure to secure compensation exchanges because of 
issues with duration and compliance is a common shortcoming 
(Race & Fonseca 1996; Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003; Gibbons 
& Lindenmayer 2007; Burgin 2008; Matthews & Endress 
2008; Brown et al. 2013). Post-decision failures of compliance 
(and subsequent enforcement) undermine compensation, and 
society bears the burden of unfulfilled promises (Beder 2000; 
Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003; Gibbons & Lindenmayer 2007; 
Keane et al. 2008; Bekessy et al. 2010; Brown et al. 2013). 
Compensation should persist for as long as the impact and 
permanent losses should not be offset by temporary gains 
(Gibbons & Lindenmayer 2007). While monitoring and follow-
up are widely recognised as being of critical importance, they 
rarely receive sufficient attention (Rubec & Hanson 2009).
Currencies that compare values of different habitats 
rely on surrogate measures of ecological value (Gibbons 
& Lindenmayer 2007). Assessment of habitat quality and 
condition can rely on predetermined indicators, or they may 
be established on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis (Quertier 
& Lavorel 2011). At the crudest level, extent of habitat lost 
and gained are compared (Quertier & Lavorel 2011). Habitat 
condition and rarity provide a more accurate reflection of 
ecological value, while use of multiple metrics or combinations 
of methods limits critical omissions (Kiesecker et al. 2009; 
Bull et al. 2013). However, methodologies continue to fail 
rigorous scrutiny, with a high likelihood of losses being 
obscured within broad considerations of value (Walker et al. 
2009; Pawliczek & Sullivan 2011).
Methods
We assessed how each of the six implementation issues in 
McKenney & Kiesecker (2010) was addressed in 110 resource 
consents issued between 1991 and 2010 by 39 councils 
across the North and South islands of New Zealand. Consent 
information typically included the consent itself, supporting 
documentation such as ecological surveys and agency officers’ 
reports, plans, and other documents such as covenants and 
was primarily provided on request by the issuing agency. 
Further details on selection of examples and study design 
are available in Brown et al. (2013), while Table 2 reflects 
the types of activities investigated. We used the case-study 
approach as it provided for the detailed, contextual and 
multidimensional analysis of a wide range of examples of 
ecological compensation, capturing variation and highlighting 
general trends beyond the circumstances of each individual 
situation (Gillham 2000; Crowe et al. 2011).
Equivalence
We grouped the case studies into four categories according to 
their principal effect, and compared that with the main form 
of compensation required for each (Table 3). In cases where 
a financial contribution was sought from the developer (n = 
20), we differentiated between those that were ring-fenced for 
in-kind exchanges and those that had considerable flexibility 
in the way in which they were to be spent. An analysis of 
exchanges at the ecosystem level was not possible, as many 
consents did not contain enough information about the types 
of habitat involved in the exchange.
Spatial proximity
The shortest distance between impact and compensation sites 
was measured in kilometres, with zero distance indicating 
ecological compensation undertaken on or immediately 
adjacent to the impacted site. Where the financial payment did 
not define a destination site but gave a scale such as ‘within 
catchment’, the furthest distance from the site to the edge of 
the catchment was used.
Additionality
We devised questions for each of the common compensation 
actions (set-asides, habitat improvements, financial payments, 
or a combination), in Table 4, and interrogated the information 
to assess whether additionality was achieved.
Timing
The numbers of requirements to be achieved prior to, concurrent 
with, and after the development were tabulated and compared. 
The length of time required (in years) for delivery of the 
compensation was then also determined from the conditions 
of the resource consent.
Duration and compliance
We assessed the number of years of specific ongoing 
requirements articulated in consents through conditions, and 
the frequency of requirements for an RMA bond to be taken 
under s.108 of the Act. We also considered tenure, noting 
where compensation actions were required to be carried out 
Table 2. Distribution of activity types in the consent case 
studies (n = 110).
____________________________________________________________________________




Water discharge 12 10.9
Agriculture 11 10
Energy generation 10 9.1
Resource extraction 8 7.3
Water abstraction 7 6.4
Recreational 4 3.6
Waste management 4 3.6
Other 2 1.8____________________________________________________________________________
Table 3. An overview of exchanges encountered in each of 
the 110 consents, showing common exchanges.
____________________________________________________________________________
 Principal compensation 
____________________________________________________________________________
Principal effect Habitat gain Financial RF Financial NRF
____________________________________________________________________________
Domestication 34 0 0
Habitat loss 41 3 5*
Other 5* 1 2*
Water take/ 10 5 4* 
discharge 
Total 90 9 11
____________________________________________________________________________
RF, ring-fenced for in-kind exchange; NRF, not ring-fenced;  
* out-of-kind exchange permitted or likely.
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on land of different tenure to the site of ownership. We then 
considered more permanent mechanisms such as covenants, 
consent notices and endowment funds, noting their relative 
frequency of use and aspects of their implementation.
Currency and ratios
We identified where a set method was used to determine the 
ecological compensation required in each of the cases, such 
as a set ratio of area of habitat damaged to area required to 
compensate for that damage.
Results
Equivalence
Most of the exchanges were equivalent at a high level, in that 
habitat loss was typically exchanged for habitat gain rather 
than for other more disparate gains (Table 3). ‘Domestication’ 
generally refers to subdivision, and is not included within 
‘Habitat loss’ because although it sometimes resulted in habitat 
loss, more typically the subdivision was undertaken to pasture 
and the principle effects of the activity related more closely to 
immediate and long-term impacts of a pastoral environment 
being converted to more intensive residential development (e.g. 
increased impervious surface, noise and light disturbance).
There were three main forms of compensation: (1) habitat 
gain (whether by condition or extent), (2) financial payments 
that were designated for a purpose, or (3) those that were 
required but their destination was not specified. ‘Habitat 
gain’ refers to the creation, management or enhancement of 
natural areas, their legal protection, or a combination thereof. 
Riparian planting was included within this, and compensated 
for water takes and discharge consents (where compensation 
was defined) in more than half the examples (52.6%). Payments 
were not clearly ring-fenced in 11 of the cases encountered 
and some were difficult or impossible to track. The out-of-kind 
exchanges encountered also included funding for research and 
monitoring, and payments to agencies for other conservation 
actions. The habitat protected or managed as compensation was 
not necessarily similar to that which was removed. Rather, the 
most intact and best examples of remaining habitat on the site 
were subject to management actions such as supplementary 
planting of existing habitat, planting of new habitat, pest 
control, and fencing (i.e. habitat improvement).
Spatial proximity
Seventy-two of the 110 (65.5%) compensation requirements 
applied to sites that were on or adjacent to the site of impact, 




Set-asides 1. Is there a formal means of protection in place for the set-aside?
 2. Is the area of the habitat already formally protected by some other means (e.g. covenant)?
 3. Is there provision for management actions to be undertaken?
 4. Was the area subsequently given to a public agency for management purposes?
Habitat improvements 1. Will the works be undertaken to public or private land?
 2. Do the works constitute the statutory responsibility of any agency?
 3. Were the works already planned or required by another means (e.g. Clean Streams Accord)?
 4. Did the works for improvement serve an additional purpose (e.g. stormwater detention)?
Financial payments Were the actions already occurring or were they new?
Purpose Was the compensation action primarily for avoidance or remediation purposes (e.g. translocation)?
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
while a further 21 (19%) were required within 50 km of the 
site of impact. The remaining 17 (15.5%) were undertaken 
more than 50 km from the site of impact (Table 5). Of the 
offsite works encountered, 20 resulted from financial payments 
required in place of or in addition to works to be undertaken 
on-site, where money was pooled under a common fund or 
paid directly to an agency. The spatial limit of compensation 
was usually defined by the jurisdiction of an agency, or the 
geographic range of a contestable fund or mitigation trust.
Several exchanges involved financial contributions to pools 
of funding for conservation purposes, including mitigation 
trusts and endowment funds. Mitigation trusts are common, 
such as the Taranaki Tree Trust (Taranaki Regional Council), 
the Hei Tini Awa Trust (Horizons Regional Council) and the 
Turanganui a Kiwa (Gisborne District Council). Establishing 
a trust or fund in this way enables councils to access funds 
from private and public bodies to undertake wider ecological 
restoration programmes in association with the community, in 
addition to receiving compensation payments. Several energy 
generation and waste management companies have established 
these structures within their consents to fund a wide programme 
of compensation measures, usually via contestable funding of 
an agreed amount (paid annually or as a one-off payment).
Additionality
Thirty-eight (94.5%) of 40 set-asides were of land not otherwise 
protected, and included requirements for management (Table 
5). Sixty-three of 110 compensation actions occurred on private 
land. Seven cases included works that are part of the statutory 
duty of an agency, such as the management of an existing 
protected area administered by a council under the Reserves 
Act 1977. Six financial payments contributed to works that were 
already occurring, such as existing pest control programmes, 
and therefore were not additional. Most management actions 
were new works, and the majority of financial payments were 
also for works that were not otherwise planned, and so were truly 
additional. Twenty cases included compensation that fulfilled 
more than one purpose, such as the creation or enhancement 
of a water feature that would later be used for stormwater 
disposal, detention and treatment. Ten cases included the 
vesting of habitat in a public agency and these cases were a 
mix of those that required a degree of management to occur 
before handover and those that were immediately vested, 
such as extensions to existing reserves on the subject-site 
boundary. Seven actions described as compensation were not 
in fact compensatory actions, but rather prevention of damage. 
These included translocation of threatened species from the 
site and retaining or restoring fish passage when diverting or 
obstructing waterways.
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Table 5. Results of analysis of key implementation issues (note that more than one metric applies to ‘Duration and  
compliance’. (See Table 3 for equivalence issue.)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Implementation issue and metric Variable N %
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 0 72 65.5
 0.2–3 km 13 11.8
 3.1–10 km 1 0.9
 11–20 km 3 2.7
 21–50 km 4 3.6
 51–100 km 3 2.7
 101–200 km 9 8.2
 201–300 km 4 3.6
 301+ km 1 0.9
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 Set-aside of unprotected land  38 34.5
 Set-aside of land already protected 2 1.8
 Set-aside with provision for management 33 30
 Set-aside with no management* 7 6.4
 Management actions to public land 29 26.4
 Management actions to non-public land 63 57.3
 Financial payment for new works 15 13.6
 Financial payment for works already occurring 6 5.5
 Statutory duty or responsibility 7 6.4
 Habitat creation or enhancement already planned 3 2.7
 Enhancement of a dual-purpose feature 20 18.2
 Actions were monitoring, avoidance or remediation measures 17 15.5
 Vestment to public agency to manage 10 9.1
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 Prior 6 5.5
 Concurrent 44 40
 After 60 54.5 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 Condition of consent, designation or consent order 102 92.7
 Other agreement (e.g. Memorandum of Understanding) 15 13.64
 Combination 8 8.8
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 Covenant 29 26.4
 RMA Bond (s.108) 25 22.7
 Consent notice (s.221) 13 11.8
 Vestment into reserve status 11 10.0
 Mitigation trust or endowment fund 7 6.4
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 Same site, same owner 67 60.9
 Another site third party 40 36.4
 Another site same owner 3 2.7
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 None 41 37.2
 0.1–5 years 37 33.6
 6–10 years 13 11.8
 11+ years 19 17.3
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 No evidence 97 88.2
 Area 10 9.1
 SEV (Stream Ecological Valuation method) 3 2.7
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
(*) No specific management refers to management actions not being prescribed in the consent, and does not include situations where 
the land is vested under a public agency with an existing maintenance programme.
Spatial proximity: Distance 
in kilometres between site of 
impact and site where ecological 
compensation was carried out
Additionality: Compensation 
actions encountered in case studies 
with respect to additionality
Timing: Time frame (years) for 
ecological compensation to be 
initiated or completed relative to 
the impact
Duration and compliance: 
Mechanisms used to secure 
compensation action
Duration and compliance: 
Mechanisms used to secure long-
term gains
Duration and compliance:  
Tenure of site of compensation 
action
Duration and compliance: 
Number of years of required action 
following granting as required by 
consent
Currency and ratio: Evidence of a 
formal approach to quantifying the 
degree of compensation required
Timing
One hundred and four of 110 (94.5%) compensatory actions 
were required concurrently with the development or following 
its completion (Table 5). There were only six requirements for 
prior action (5.5%), and in most cases they were developer-
driven, such as boutique subdivisions where most of the 
ecological restoration took place prior to application, for dual 
purposes of conservation and amenity. Most requirements 
involved the protection of extant habitat and its enhancement 
with some supplementary planting, while others involved 
planting from scratch. There was little evidence that the time 
lag between impact and compensation action (e.g. planting 
reaching maturity) was a factor in decision-making. In one 
instance, however, an applicant was required to undertake 
habitat enhancement activities in a nearby reserve in addition 
to establishing the new area of planting. The consent assumed 
that enhancement works would help maintain habitat values 
in the vicinity in the 10 years until the new planting matured.
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Duration and compliance
Compensation was usually secured by making it a condition 
of consent. Some agreements were secured by an alternative 
means such as a Memorandum of Understanding or other form 
of side agreement. In eight cases, both an agreement and a 
consent condition reflected the compensation requirements 
(Table 5).
The gains required to meet compensation requirements 
were secured with covenants, consent notices under s.221 of 
the RMA, mitigation trusts and other endowment funds, and 
they included land vested with agencies for protection purposes. 
An RMA bond provides for a cash or bank-guaranteed bond 
to be held by the agency to be uplifted in the case of default. 
Twenty-five consents required that a bond be held by the 
agency under s.108 of the RMA (Table 5). Sixty-seven of 110 
compensation actions (60.9%) were required to occur on the 
site of impact, while nearly all the others occur on a different 
site with unconnected tenure.
Resource consent conditions may specify a length of time 
within which specific tasks have to be carried out, such as pest 
management and monitoring. The mean number of years for 
continuing requirements in consents where this was stipulated 
was 11.3 with an overall median of 7.4. The figures related to 
years of management do not include outside arrangements such 
as covenants, which often require action for longer, perhaps 
even in perpetuity.
Currency and ratios
In 97 cases (88.2%) no objective metric had been applied and 
in 10 cases area was used as an informal metric of biodiversity 
loss. Three of the 110 consents reflected the application of 
the Stream Ecological Valuation method (Rowe et al. 2009).
Discussion
Most exchanges are undertaken between broadly similar values, 
and habitat improvement and set-asides are by far the most 
common means of compensating for ecological harm. Many 
cases where financial contributions had been sought left open 
the possibility of a significantly unlike exchange. Although 
out-of-kind exchanges are becoming more common around 
the world there is a lack of tools or guidelines for decision-
making for unlike exchanges (McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010). 
If New Zealand follows the rest of the world in the increasing 
frequency of out-of-kind exchanges, methods and decision 
support tools will be needed if compensation is to be quantified 
and objectively determined.
The majority (77.3%) of compensation requirements were 
carried out within 3 km of the site where the loss occurred, but 
many occurred much further away. If off-site compensation 
becomes more common, a lack of a formal framework in 
which to manage exchanges will be limiting. By contrast, 
many jurisdictions around the world orchestrate exchanges of 
biodiversity more systematically through large-scale operations 
(e.g. US wetland mitigation banking; Burgin 2010; BenDor 
& Riggsbee 2011). Uncontrolled off-site compensation could 
lead to an expansion of low quality ‘restored’ habitat in the 
place of destroyed high quality habitat. Macro-scale landscape 
changes cannot be detected with piecemeal methods (BenDor & 
Riggsbee 2011). Most instances of compensation at a distance 
were enabled by mitigation trusts. The use of mitigation trusts 
has potential advantages, but care is required in drafting project 
eligibility requirements. We noted significant variation in 
the deeds and other governing criteria for trusts, with some 
having very specific requirements related to the key general 
principles for use of the funds.
Compensation was typically required during or after 
a development, although best practice typically calls for 
implementation in advance to reduce risks to ecosystems 
and species (McKenney & Kiesecker 2010; Gardner & von 
Hase 2012; Pilgrim et al. 2013). The few examples of prior 
requirements is likely due in part to a lack of formal mechanisms 
to recognise prior works. In two cases there was clear evidence 
in background documents that the agencies involved were 
reluctant to accept that the works are additional if they are 
undertaken in advance and outside the consent process. Some 
types of consents, such as subdivisions, provide an opportunity 
to tie some achievements to the release of the s.224C certificate 
(certification that confirms that the conditions of subdivision 
consent have been met, issued by a city or district council), but 
most consents issued under the RMA (e.g. land use consents) 
have no such option.
Compared with many other jurisdictions, New Zealand 
landowners and agencies face few statutory requirements as 
regards ecological management. Habitat improvements such 
as weed and pest management or fencing of streams, wetlands 
or lake are typically a decision of the landowner. Therefore, 
most new management actions to habitat on private land in 
New Zealand are considered additional, owing to an absence 
of a minimum standard of land management and alternative 
statutory means for compelling actions such as pest control.
Active management of protected areas in New Zealand 
is critically important to the persistence of the biodiversity 
values. New Zealand has a large portion of land protected for 
the primary purpose of conservation at 8 763 300 hectares or 
33.4% of the total land area (Ministry for the Environment 
2010). Funding for the management of protected areas is 
typically constrained, however, and there is an absence of 
quantifiable and time-bound goals for biodiversity management 
(Green & Clarkson 2005).
Compensation payments can result in planned works being 
carried out sooner than expected. For example, if a council 
uses a compensation payment to fund a planting project, the 
advancement of the work can increase the additionality of 
the gain. Of critical importance to assessing additionality, 
particularly on public land, is that compensation requirements 
do not simply result in cost-shifting (Christensen 2008). Cost-
shifting is when compensation payments displace other funding 
used for a given conservation purpose.
Duration and compliance is of concern in New Zealand, as 
recent research has found that many compensation requirements 
are not met (Brown et al. 2013). Most compensation 
requirements (70.9%) cease within 5 years – usually specifying 
an expectation of the end of agency monitoring and oversight, 
particularly where there is no corresponding agency monitoring 
regime for covenants or consent notices (which is commonly 
the case). Compensation requirements are usually expressed as 
conditions of consent, while a range of other mechanisms are 
used to secure those actions including RMA bonds, covenants 
and mitigation trusts.
The most basic form of security is robust conditions that 
set clear and detailed requirements, set out in an enforceable 
document such as a consent or side agreement referred to in 
that consent, designation, or a consent order. The likelihood of 
securing any given compensation requirement, and to enforce 
it in the case of default, diminishes with increasing ambiguity 
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of stated requirements. In some cases, conditions that had 
been negotiated were not actually included in the consent 
itself, omitting a clear legal mandate for the consent holder 
to undertake the works (Marshall 2001). This is of serious 
concern, because the conditions represent the key means of 
ensuring that the adverse effects of the activity are avoided, 
remedied, or mitigated (Ministry for the Environment 2001).
The research also revealed significant issues with the 
security measures that are imposed to ensure compensation 
works occur. Covenants and consent notices were commonly 
used but very few agencies appear to have a formal means 
of recording and archiving them in a way that ensures their 
regular monitoring and evaluation. We also noted that the 
use of endowment funds or mitigation trusts was becoming 
common, particularly in large projects where there is a wide 
range of effects. However, our research showed that more than 
half of the financial payments required as compensation had 
indeterminate ends, meaning that they might or are likely to 
result in out-of-kind exchanges, potentially leading to ongoing 
environmental losses.
We encountered few instances of quantification or 
standardised methods of compensation assessment. The level 
of compensation seems to have been determined primarily 
by the resourcing by and willingness of the applicant, and 
the council specifying and insisting on a minimum standard. 
Financial payments were typically determined via negotiation, 
rather than an objective assessment of the magnitude of effects, 
or against a consistent and transparent cost scale.
In the recent case of Transmission Gully, a project 
involving the extension of a road through significant habitat, 
the quantification of the offset through an ‘environmental 
compensation ratio’ was discussed. The Court noted that 
ratios would be ‘always a subject of debate’, and that the final 
determination of appropriate mitigation was reasonably the 
domain of the judiciary and not any one method (Environmental 
Protection Authority 2011).
Conclusion
Ecological compensation is an increasingly common 
mechanism around the world, which has the potential to 
significantly contribute both to ameliorating the impacts of 
continued development and augmenting wider conservation 
efforts. Our review of process and consent variables suggests 
that the consideration and implementation of ecological 
compensation in New Zealand is noticeably ad hoc. Therefore, 
ecological compensation as it is presently implemented is 
unlikely to achieve environmental protection goals.
It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of ecological 
compensation without strategic and consent-specific goals for 
ecological compensation. Unambiguous goals are needed to 
specify what compensatory mechanisms are to achieve, what 
types are acceptable in what situations, and when ecological 
compensation is unlikely to be appropriate. Goals should be 
measurable, such that, in time, a quantitative analysis can 
be undertaken on the implementation of these mechanisms 
in New Zealand. Increased emphasis upon monitoring and 
compliance by agencies is also necessary such that instances of 
default can be identified and rectified as soon as possible. We 
conclude that the application of ecological compensation under 
the RMA in New Zealand requires significant improvement 
if the ongoing erosion of the natural capital upon which our 
prosperity and economy ultimately depends is to be slowed 
and reversed. Ecological compensation remains a catalyst for 
creating greater synergies between ecological and economic 
interests, but the successful implementation of the concept is 
some way off.
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